A standard picture of humans as generally ordered and orderly thinkers has come under significant pressure in recent years, in particular from the work of Kahneman and others who have stressed our susceptibility to a range of cognitive traps (such as framing or bias). Although the claim commonly associated with this school of thought – that we are ‘predictably irrational’, in Ariely’s phrase – has been rejected by many, even those who seek to defend our status as good reasoners often suggest a more complex and potentially messy set of processes, mechanisms and features than those standardly appealed to in classic folk psychological approaches.
SUMMER SEMINAR SERIES 2021

20 APRIL
Rationality: reasons and heuristics
Emma Borg

Emma is Director of the Reading Centre for Cognition Research and Professor of Philosophy at University of Reading.

27 APRIL
Folk psychology, normative cognition, and the wide distribution of norms
Kristin Andrews

Kristin Andrews is York Research Chair in Animal Minds and Professor of Philosophy at York University (Toronto), where she also helps coordinate the Cognitive Science program and the Greater Toronto Area Animal Cognition Discussion Group. Her research explores the evolution of morality, the pluralistic and normative nature of human folk psychology, animal cognition, and normativity in human and nonhuman animals.

4 MAY
The logic of universalization guides moral judgment
Fiery Cushman

Fiery Cushman is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, where he directs the Moral Psychology Research Laboratory. His research addresses the balance between learned and innate contributions to cognition; the human capacity to explain, predict and evaluate others’ behavior; and the architecture of learning and decision-making in a social context.

11 MAY
Why do humans reason?
Hugo Mercier

Hugo Mercier is a research scientist at the CNRS (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), where his work with the Evolution and Social Cognition team and the Collective Intelligence team has focused on two main topics: The function and workings of reasoning (see The Enigma of Reason) and How we evaluate communicated information (see Not Born Yesterday).

18 MAY
Normative folk psychology and decision theory
Joe Dewhurst

Joe Dewhurst is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, where he is working on a perspectival account of mechanistic functions in biology and cognitive science, as well as related projects on emergence and autonomy in the special sciences.

25 MAY
Conversational experiments: some reflections on Sperber and Mercier
Kathryn Francis, Hamish Greening, Nat Hansen

Kathryn Francis is a Lecturer in Psychology, University of Keele, Nat Hansen is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading. Hamish Greening was Research Assistant on Hansen’s project ‘New Online Methods in Experimental Philosophy of Language’.

8 JUNE
Summing up
Emma Borg

The aim of this seminar series is to explore these newer approaches to reasoning and rationality, looking at cutting edge work in the area and asking what these moves might tell us about how we go about understanding the actions of others and ourselves.

If you have any questions, please email Emma Borg e.g.n.borg@reading.ac.uk