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DTSTART:20210328T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210222T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210225T134500
DTSTAMP:20260612T025024
CREATED:20210222T135444Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210222T152307Z
UID:2216-1613998800-1614260700@research.reading.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Meshael Batarfi "What differences are there between male and female managers? Evidence from elite women’s soccer" - PhD Seminar
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nWe investigate male and female managers in a highly competitive and data-rich setting: association football. While in men’s football there is minimal gender variation in the high-profile roles\, in women’s football men often take up top management positions; indeed in our dataset 75.18 % of the 14\,000 national and international matches between 1983 and 2020 involved at least one team coached by a male manager. We find significant differences between male and female coaches in a number of the measured characteristics indicating differences in risk preferences. 
URL:https://research.reading.ac.uk/economics/event/meshael-batarfi-tbc-phd-seminar/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:PhD Seminars
ORGANIZER;CN="Carl%20Singleton":MAILTO:c.a.singleton@reading.ac.uk
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210225T134500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210225T143000
DTSTAMP:20260612T025024
CREATED:20210222T203036Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210222T203036Z
UID:2220-1614260700-1614263400@research.reading.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Shahabeddin Gharaati (RHUL) "The welfare effects of introducing a tax on a collateralized loan" - PhD Seminar
DESCRIPTION:Abstract\n\nIn this paper\, I examine the effects of introducing a tax on social welfare in models with collateral and default. Two models are considered. The first model incorporates default and collateral in a standard two-period general equilibrium with incomplete markets; the second is a model with a continuum of investors in the binomial economy who have different beliefs about the asset’s price. The individual that issues the security pays tax in the first period\, then all agents receive a transfer in the second period. In both models\, the borrower demand for the collateralizable durable good decreases. The borrower is worse off due to an increase in the interest rate and a negative income effect.  On the other hand\, a taxation policy benefits the lender through the effect of the tax on the equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium price of the durable good. In the model with different beliefs\, the utilitarian welfare function always increases; however\, in the standard model\, the social welfare function increase depends on the distribution of endowments of the perishable good in the first period.
URL:https://research.reading.ac.uk/economics/event/shahabeddin-gharaati-rhul-the-welfare-effects-of-introducing-a-tax-on-a-collateralized-loan-phd-seminar/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:PhD Seminars
ORGANIZER;CN="Carl%20Singleton":MAILTO:c.a.singleton@reading.ac.uk
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